IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/compsc/v18y2001i2p251-267.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Presidents and Defense Contracting, 1953-1992

Author

Listed:
  • Karl DeRouen Jr

    (University of Canterbury)

  • Uk Heo

    (University of Wisconsi-Milwaukee)

Abstract

We analyze the politics of the U.S. defense budget from 1953 to 1992. Institutional factors make it impractical for the president to use aggregate defense spending politically. For this reason, we focus on defense prime contract awards (PCA) because they are removed from public opinion, do not require congressional approval and can be precisely timed. We assess differences in contracting behavior between presidential administrations. The model we specify posits that government policies are reflective of approval ratings and that the president uses defense contracts to counter sagging approval and/or a weak economy. A statistical model is tested using pooled time-series analysis that allows us to assess variation between and within administrations. Controlling for presidential administrations, war and Soviet crisis behavior, our analysis reveals that significant differences in defense contracting exist between administrations and that presidential approval, war, the electoral cycle, and unemployment are significant determinants of defense contracting.

Suggested Citation

  • Karl DeRouen Jr & Uk Heo, 2001. "Presidents and Defense Contracting, 1953-1992," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 18(2), pages 251-267, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:251-267
    DOI: 10.1177/073889420101800204
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/073889420101800204
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/073889420101800204?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Williams, John T., 1990. "The Political Manipulation of Macroeconomic Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 84(3), pages 767-795, September.
    2. Robert J. Barro, 1991. "Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 407-443.
    3. Fair, Ray C, 1978. "The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 60(2), pages 159-173, May.
    4. Griffin, L J & Wallace, M & Devine, J, 1982. "The Political Economy of Military Spending: Evidence from the United States," Cambridge Journal of Economics, Cambridge Political Economy Society, vol. 6(1), pages 1-14, March.
    5. William P. Rogerson, 1994. "Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 65-90, Fall.
    6. Hartley, Thomas & Russett, Bruce, 1992. "Public Opinion and the Common Defense: Who Governs Military Spending in the United States?," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(4), pages 905-915, December.
    7. Kiefer, David M, 1988. "A History of the U.S. Federal Budget and Fiscal Policy," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 43(1), pages 113-137.
    8. William D. Nordhaus, 1975. "The Political Business Cycle," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(2), pages 169-190.
    9. May, Ann Mari, 1990. "President Eisenhower, Economic Policy, and the 1960 Presidential Election," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 50(2), pages 417-427, June.
    10. Ostrom, Charles W. & Simon, Dennis M., 1985. "Promise and Performance: A Dynamic Model of Presidential Popularity," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(2), pages 334-358, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hibbs, Douglas A, Jr, 2000. "Bread and Peace Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 149-180, July.
    2. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
    3. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political economics and macroeconomic policy," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & M. Woodford (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 22, pages 1397-1482, Elsevier.
    4. Rebecca Hellerstein, 2007. "Is There a Dead Spot? New Evidence on FOMC Decisions Before Elections," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(6), pages 1411-1427, September.
    5. Gerald T. Fox, 2009. "Partisan Divide on War and the Economy," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 53(6), pages 905-933, December.
    6. Karl R. DeRouen Jr., 1995. "The Indirect Link:," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 39(4), pages 671-695, December.
    7. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 166(1), pages 235-259, January.
    8. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Post-Print hal-01291401, HAL.
    9. Blessing Chiripanhura & Miguel Niño‐Zarazúa, 2015. "Aid, Political Business Cycles and Growth in Africa," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(8), pages 1387-1421, November.
    10. Jeroen Klomp, 2020. "Election or Disaster Support?," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(1), pages 205-220, January.
    11. Oriola, Hugo, 2023. "Political monetary cycles: An empirical study," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 79(C).
    12. Klomp, Jeroen, 2023. "Political budget cycles in military expenditures: A meta-analysis," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 1083-1102.
    13. Yogesh Uppal, 2011. "Does legislative turnover adversely affect state expenditure policy? Evidence from Indian state elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 147(1), pages 189-207, April.
    14. Janet Pack, 1987. "The political policy cycle: Presidential effort vs. presidential control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 231-259, August.
    15. Kouvavas, Omiros, 2013. "Political Budget Cycles Revisited, the Case for Social Capital," MPRA Paper 57504, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 15 Sep 2013.
    16. William D. Nordhaus, 1989. "Alternative Approaches to the Political Business Cycle," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(2), pages 1-68.
    17. S. Brock Blomberg, 1992. "Growth, political instability, and the defense burden," International Finance Discussion Papers 436, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    18. Wadhwa, Kavita & Syamala, Sudhakara Reddy, 2023. "Are business groups different from other family firms? Evidence from corporate investments during political uncertainty," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).
    19. Paola Assael & Felipe Larraín, 1994. "El Ciclo Político-económico: Teoría, Evidencia y Extensión para una Economía Abierta," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 31(92), pages 87-114.
    20. Cáceres, Neila & Malone, Samuel W., 2015. "Optimal Weather Conditions, Economic Growth, and Political Transitions," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 16-30.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:18:y:2001:i:2:p:251-267. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.