La Costituzione italiana e la moneta: un incontro mancato
AbstractThe paper traces the principle of monetary stability throughout the political and cultural debates, which Luigi Einaudi contributed to since 1943, and the discussions in the Sub-Committees, the Committee and the full House of the Constituent Assembly in 1946-47 up to the approval of the Charter. The safeguard of savings was given a constitutional umbrella, which was denied to its premise, i.e. the commitment to defend the purchasing power of the currency. This principle is today enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty and the Ecb statute, a clear proof that economic constitutionalism can be helpful in pointing the direction of monetary policy.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by SIPI Spa in its journal Rivista di Politica Economica.
Volume (Year): 96 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (July-August)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1984.
"Rules, Discretion and Reputation in a Model of Monetary Policy,"
NBER Working Papers
1079, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
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