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The Stock-Based Compensation Plans for Top Managemen

Author

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  • Petrov, Ivam

    (HSE NRU)

  • Chirkova, Evgeniya

    (HSE NRU)

Abstract

The article deals with the use of stock-based compensation plans of top management by the Russian public companies. The empirical study shows that, in Russia, such compensation plans are mostly used by companies operating in regulated and commodity-producing industries where management is the least able to affect the capitalization; the most popular are the option-based plans going out of fashion in the USA; the options exercise prices are lower than the market share prices at the date of granting the option while in the USA those are equal or high than that; and the duration of the programs is shorter. At the same time, in the Russian stock-based compensation plans there are prevailing conditions preventing managers from leaving the firm and there are popular additional KPI, i. e. conditions aimed at better protection of the interests of shareholders.

Suggested Citation

  • Petrov, Ivam & Chirkova, Evgeniya, 2012. "The Stock-Based Compensation Plans for Top Managemen," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 1-17.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1259
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    References listed on IDEAS

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