AbstractI study the optimal design of marketable permit systems to regulate various pollutants (e.g., air pollution in urban areas) when the regulator lives in a real world of imperfect information and incomplete enforcement. I show that the regulator should hale pollution markets integrated through optimal exchange rates when the marginal-abatement cost curves in the different markets are steeper than the marginal-benefit curves; otherwise he should keep markets separated. I also find that incomplete enforcement reduces the advantage of market integration. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 32 (2001)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
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