Intertemporal Mixed Bundling and Buying Frenzies
AbstractBy initially selling goods only in bundles and subsequently selling unsold units individually, a multiproduct seller can create a buying frenzy in which his profit is higher than it would be if he sold all units individually at their market clearing prices. In this frenzy, high-valuation customers buy a bundle because they expect quantity rationing when units are sold individually. Their purchases reduce the quantity to be sold individually, causing the shortages that result in rationing. The bundle's price exceeds the sum of the individual prices, a fact observed in markets for rock concert tickets.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 30 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4 (Winter)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.