Joint Bidding, Information Pooling, and the Performance of Petroleum Lease Auctions
AbstractThis article uses a game-theoretic bidding model to examine the effect of joint bidding in offshore petroleum lease auctions. We show that joint bidding increases the total social value of the lease offering and, in most cases, does not significantly decrease the percentage of social value captured by the government. These results follow from the fact that pooling of information concerning a priori unknown tract values allows for more accurate estimates. The anticompetitive effect of a reduced number of bidders tends to be offset by the well-known fact that better informed participants bid more aggressively. Our findings are striking in that the model abstracts entirely from the effects of increased entry and greater risk diversification, the two common arguments in support of joint bidding.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal Bell Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 14 (1983)
Issue (Month): 2 (Autumn)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.rje.org
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dalkir, Serdar & Logan, John W. & Masson, Robert T., 2000. "Mergers in symmetric and asymmetric noncooperative auction markets: the effects on prices and efficiency," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 383-413, April.
- Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2013. "Information concentration in common value environments," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 183-203, September.
- Peter Cramton, 1995.
"Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction,"
Papers of Peter Cramton
95jems, University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter Cramton, revised 09 Jun 1998.
- Cramton, Peter C, 1995. "Money Out of Thin Air: The Nationwide Narrowband PCS Auction," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(2), pages 267-343, Summer.
- Loyola, Gino, 2012. "Optimal and efficient takeover contests with toeholds," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 203-216.
- Marquez, Robert & Singh, Rajdeep, 2013. "The economics of club bidding and value creation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 493-505.
- Waehrer, Keith, 1999. "Asymmetric private values auctions with application to joint bidding and mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 437-452, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.