L’efficacité économique du mode d’allocation des ressources naturelles
AbstractIn this paper, the decentralized economic allocation of a common property resource is fully characterized in a dynamic framework. Because of the externalities involved, this mode of allocation is shown to be inefficient. The extent and the causes of this inefficiency are discussed, with special emphasis on a kind of externality herein called the "appropriability". Finally, economic policies involving taxation, subsidy and user charge which purpose to bring about the social optimum are pointed out.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.
Volume (Year): 51 (1975)
Issue (Month): 3 (juillet)
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- Plourde, C G, 1970. "A Simple Model of Replenishable Natural Resource Exploitation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 518-22, June.
- H. Scott Gordon, 1954. "The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 62, pages 124.
- Smith, Vernon L, 1969. "On Models of Commercial Fishing," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(2), pages 181-98, March/Apr.
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