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La piratería de derechos de autor y el desarrollo: evidencia de los Estados Unidos en el siglo XIX

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Author Info
Zorina Khan () (Bowdoin College)
Abstract

Does the lack of international copyrights benefit or harm developing countries? This article examines the effects of U.S. copyright piracy during a period when the U.S. was a developing country. U.S. statutes protected the copyrights of American citizens from 1790, but until 1891 deemed the works of foreign citizens to be in the public domain. In 1891, the laws were changed to allow foreigners to obtain copyright protection in the United States if certain conditions were met. Thus, this episode in American history provides us with a convenient way of investigating the consequences of international copyright piracy. The analysis is based on copyright registrations, information on authors, book titles and prices, financial data from the accounts of a major publishing company, and lawsuits regarding copyright questions to investigate the welfare effects of widespread infringement of foreign works on American publishers, writers, and the public. The results suggest that the United States benefited from piracy and that the choice of copyright regime was endogenous to the level of economic development.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía in its journal Revista de Economía Institucional.

Volume (Year): 10 (2008)
Issue (Month): 18 (January-June)
Pages: 21-54
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Handle: RePEc:rei:ecoins:v:10:y:2008:i:18:p:21-54

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Keywords: copyrights development

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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