Means Tested Public Assistance and the Demand for State Lottery Tickets
AbstractEmpirical evidence suggests that the poor spend a larger fraction of their income on gambling than the well-to-do. This paper shows that "means tests" for public-assistance eligibility could supply part of the explanation. Income support programs can distort private budget sets, conceivably leading to risk-taking behavior on the part of rational agents with standard, concave utility functions. Latter sections of the paper employ a calibrated life-cycle saving model to study resulting demands for actuarially fair lotteries numerically. The analysis demonstrates that allowing lotteries can simplify model-related computations a great deal. (Copyright: Elsevier)
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics in its journal Review of Economic Dynamics.
Volume (Year): 2 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
- D91 - Microeconomics - - Intertemporal Choice - - - Intertemporal Household Choice; Life Cycle Models and Saving
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
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- Morgan, John, 2000. "Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(4), pages 761-84, October.
Blog mentionsAs found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
- Why buying a lottery ticket may be rational
by Economic Logician in Economic Logic on 2008-01-28 09:08:00
- Cletus C. Coughlin & Thomas A. Garrett, 2008. "Income and lottery sales: transfers trump income from work and wealth," Working Papers 2008-004, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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