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L'épidémie de crises bancaires dans les pays de l'OCDE

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  • Jacques Le Cacheux
  • Thomas Lambert
  • Audrey Mahuet

Abstract

[eng] Over the past fifteen years, the banking systems of industrialized countries have had quite contrasted performances. Whereas Germany has been sheltered from trouble, the US, France, the UK Japan and Scandinavian countries have all been affected by banking crises, the depth and precise characteristics of which have however been diverse. To get rid of their problems, Scandinavian countries have had to inject such iarge amounts of funds (up to 15% of GDP in the case of Finland) that their public finances have been durably deteriorated. In the US, difficulties in banking have reached a degree unprecedented since the Great Depression of the 1930s: about 1500 commercial banks and 1200 Saving & Loans Insitutions have failed between 1984 and 1995. In Japan, the total amount of non-performing assets held by banks is currently estimated at about US$ 600 billions. In France, the critical situations of the Crédit Lyonnais, the Comptoir des Entrepreneurs or the Crédit Foncier are well known. Finally, the UK has lived through some highly publicized failures such as those of the BCCI and Barings. How to account for the seemingly increasing difficulties facing traditional banking and for the apparent diversity of national situations? Three factors may be looked at: the degree of concentration of national banking systems, the magnitude and speed of deregulation and the roles of banks in the financing of national economic activity. Each of these elements differs from one country to the other and contributes to the uniqueness of each national banking system. Hence, the problem arising in the European Union concerning the prevention and treatment of banking crises: given the diversity of national banking systems and of the national institutional in charge of their supervision and control, the stability of the European banking and financial sector is not guaranteed in the absence of a central authority. [fre] Au cours des quinze dernières années, les systèmes bancaires des grands pays industrialisés ont connu des évolutions contrastées. Si l'Allemagne a su demeurer à l'abri des difficultés, les Etats-Unis, la France, le Royaume-Uni, le Japon et les pays Scandinaves ont tous été affectés par des crises dont l'ampleur et les modalités ont cependantété trèsdiverses. Les pays Scandinaves ont dû fournir des montants tellement considérables pour venir à bout de la crise (jusqu'à 15 % du PIB en Finlande) qu'ils ont lourdement grevé les finances publiques. Aux Etats-Unis, les difficultés ont atteint une ampleur sans précédent depuis la dépression des années trente : environ 1500 banques commerciales et 1 200 caisses d'épargne ont fait faillite entre 1984 et 1995. Au Japon, on estime que les créances douteuses s'élèvent à 600 milliards de dollars pour l'ensemble des établissements de crédit. En France, la situation du Crédit Lyonnais, du Comptoir des Entrepreneurs et celle du Crédit Foncier sont bien connues. Le Royaume-Uni, enfin, a subi quelques faillites retentissantes dont celles de la BCCI et de la Barings. Comment rendre compte des difficultés croissantes que semble connaître /'intermediation bancaire traditionnelle, en même temps que de la diversité des situations nationales ? Trois éléments peuvent être mis en avant afin d'apporter une réponse à cette interrogation : la concentration des systèmes bancaires, l'ampjeui etja rapidité des changements réglementaires intervenus ces dernières années et la place de la banque dans l'organisation du système économique. Chacun de ces éléments intervient de façon différente dans chaque pays et est à l'origine d'un système bancaire unique dont les forces et les faiblesses s'articulent de façon différente. Se pose alors, notamment à l'échelle de l'Union européenne, le problème de l'organisation de la supervision des établissements bancaires et de la gestion des crises. La diversité des structures bancaires nationales et celle des futures instances européennes en charge de leur surveillance semblent telles qu'en l'absence d'une véritable autorité centrale, la stabilité de l'espace bancaire et financier européen n'apparaît pas véritablement assurée.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue de l'OFCE.

Volume (Year): 61 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 93-138

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Handle: RePEc:prs:rvofce:ofce_0751-6614_1997_num_61_1_1454

Note: DOI:10.3406/ofce.1997.1454
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Web page: http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/revue/ofce

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  1. Slovin, Myron B & Sushka, Marie E & Polonchek, John A, 1993. " The Value of Bank Durability: Borrowers as Bank Stakeholders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(1), pages 247-66, March.
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  7. John H. Boyd & Mark Gertler, 1994. "The role of large banks in the recent U.S. banking crisis," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Win, pages 2-21.
  8. Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1990. "Bank Monitoring and Investment: Evidence from the Changing Structure of Japanese Corporate Banking Relationships," NBER Chapters, in: Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment, pages 105-126 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Jean-Charles Rochet, 1991. "Déréglementation et risque du secteur bancaire," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 19(4), pages 57-68.
  10. Gilbert, R Alton, 1984. "Bank Market Structure and Competition: A Survey," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 16(4), pages 617-44, November.
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