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Modes de formation des salaires et stagflation : une analyse en termes de théorie des jeux

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  • Pierre Cahuc

Abstract

[fre] Modes de formation des salaires et stagflation : une analyse en termes de théorie des jeux. . Cet article analyse l'impact de formations centralisées et décentralisées des salaires sur le chômage et l'inflation dans un jeu répété où les entreprises fixent les prix, le ou les syndicats les salaires nominaux et le gouvernement la quantité de monnaie en circulation. Des négociations décentralisées entraînent des taux de chômage et d'inflation supérieurs à ceux prévalant dans une économie centralisée pour la solution temporellement cohérente du jeu répété. La différence entre ces taux est d'autant plus grande que le pouvoir de monopole des entreprises sur le marché des biens est important. Les conditions entraînant des stratégies de coopération sont identiques quels que soient les modes de formation des salaires quand le jeu est à information complète et à horizon infini. Enfin les équilibres « réputationnels » qui permettent au gouvernement d'atteindre ses objectifs d'emploi et d'inflation en menaçant le ou les syndicats sont d'autant plus faciles à atteindre que la formation des salaires est décentralisée et que le pouvoir de monopole des entreprises sur le marché des biens est important. [eng] Centralized versus decentralized wage setting: inflation and unemployment implications. . This paper analyzes unemployment and inflation rates determination in a repeated game where prices are fixed by firms, nominal wages by centralized or decentralized unions(s), and money balance by government. The decentralized wage setting time consistent solution of the game is characterized by higher unemployment and inflation rates than the centralized one. In an infinitely repeated game with complete information, cooperative equilibria, which permit to government to obtain Pareto efficient solution with zero inflation rate, are identical whatever the wage setting. At last, Stackelberg trigger strategies are more probably effective in decentralized wage setting when the game is finite with incomplete information.

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  • Pierre Cahuc, 1989. "Modes de formation des salaires et stagflation : une analyse en termes de théorie des jeux," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(3), pages 421-440.
    • Handle: RePEc:prs:reveco:reco_0035-2764_1989_num_40_3_409147
    DOI: 10.3406/reco.1989.409147
    Note: DOI:10.3406/reco.1989.409147
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    1. Pierre Cahuc, 1990. "La théorie des négociations salariales : une revue de la littérature," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 21-30.
    2. Robert Boyer & André Orléan, 1991. "Les transformations des conventions salariales entre théorie et histoire : d'Henry Ford au fordisme," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 42(2), pages 233-272.
    3. Patrick Artus & Moncef Kaabi, 1994. "Comment limiter les méfaits des marchés internes du travail," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 45(3), pages 369-384.

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