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Franchise sur les soins ambulatoires et équité sociale

Author

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  • Claire Lachaud-Fiume
  • Christine Largeron-Leténo
  • Lise Rochaix-Ranson

Abstract

[spa] Franquicia sobre los cuidados ambulatorios y equidad social . Microsimulaciôn de una via de responsabilizaciôn de los usuarios del sistema de cuidados . El control de los gastos de sanidad ha ido descansando mâs en los 90 sobre la regulaciôn de la oferta que sobre la de la demanda, manteniendo sin cambiar el nivel y la estructura de la participaciôn financiera de los usuarios. La responsabilizaciôn de éstos sigue siendo lo esencial del debate : el establecimiento de franquicias sobre el reembolso de los cuidados podrfa constituir un factor eficiente de reducciôn del "riesgo moral". Se ha elaborado un modelo de microsimulaciôn para medir las consecuencias de estas en términos de equidad y desde el punto de vista de su aceptabilidad social. El montante de una franquicia, uniforme para todas las familias de asegurados sociales, determinado por un objetivo moderado de economfa global, Ilegarfa a unos 1 000 francos al ano y por familia. Como es de suponer, tal dispositivo afectarfa negativamente a aquellas familias que tienen las rentas mâs bajas. Este carâcter regresivo puede atenuarse con una definiciôn individual del montante de la franquicia que tome en cuenta el tamano y los recursos de la familia. Una modulaciôn segûn el nivel de renta individual permite incluso Ilegar a una situaciôn mâs equitativa que la situaciôn inicial sin franquicia . Siguiendo esta hipôtesis, el umbral impuesto a las familias que pertenecen al grupo mediano de renta résulta ser una variable déterminante para dicho objetivo de equidad social. [fre] Franchise sur les soins ambulatoires et équité sociale . Approche par microsimulation d'une voie de responsabilisation possible des usagers du système de soins . L'objectif de maîtrise des dépenses de santé s'est davantage attaché depuis les années 90 à la régulation de l'offre qu'à celle de la demande, en maintenant inchangés le niveau et la structure de la participation financière des usagers. Leur responsabilisation reste cependant au cœur du débat : la mise en place de franchises sur le remboursement des soins pourrait constituer un facteur efficace de réduction du risque moral. Un modèle de microsimulation a été construit pour en évaluer les conséquences à la fois en termes d'équité et du point de vue de leur acceptabilité sociale. Un scénario de référence d'une franchise uniforme pour toutes les familles d'assurés sociaux (FAS), dont le montant serait déterminé par un objectif d'économies globales . modéré, conduit pour le seuil de remboursement à un ordre de grandeur de 1 000 F par an et par famille. Par ailleurs, se trouve confirmée l'idée intuitive suivant laquelle un tel dispositif pénalise les familles disposant des revenus les plus modestes. Ce caractère régressif peut être atténué par une fixation individuelle du montant de la franchise, tenant compte de la taille et des ressources de la famille. Une modulation suivant le niveau de revenu par personne, notamment, permet d'aboutir à une situation plus équitable que la situation initiale sans franchise ; le seuil imposé aux familles appartenant à la tranche médiane de revenu s'avère une variable déterminante pour un tel objectif d'équité verticale. [eng] Uninsured Out-Patient Care and Social Equity . Microsimulation of a Way of Making Health System Users Pay for their Spending . Control of health care expenditure in the 1990s has concentrated more on regulating supply than demand by freezing the level and structure of the financial participation of users. Yet making users responsible for their own spending remains a core issue. An effective way of reducing the moral hazard could be to introduce an excess on health care reimbursements after the fashion of insurance policies. A microsimulation model has been built to evaluate the consequences of this in terms of equity and social acceptability. . The uninsured portion would be the same for all covered families and would be determined by a moderate total . savings goal. It would be set at approximately the first 1 ,000 French francs of health care spending per family per year. Obviously, such a mechanism would penalise the families with the lowest incomes. This regressive aspect could be mitigated by setting individual sums according to family size and resources. Adjustments, based in particular on income level per person, may even lead to a more equitable situation than before the introduction of an excess. Under this hypothesis, the threshold for families in the median income bracket is a determinant variable for such a vertical equity goal. [ger] Selbstbeteiligung bei ambulanter Gesundheitsfùrsorge und soziale Gerechtigkeit . Mikrosimulation einer Mitverantwortung der Nutzer der Fùrsorgesysteme . Seit den 90er Jahren konzentriert man sich bei der Eindâmmung der Gesundheitsausgaben eher auf die Regulierung des Angebotes als auf diejenige der Nachf rage, wobei das Niveau und die Strukturderfinanziellen Beteiligung der Nutzer unverândert bleiben. Ihre Einbeziehung in die Verantwortung ist jedoch nach wie vor ein zentrales Thema; denn die Einfùhrung einer Selbstbeteiligung bei der Kostenerstattung der Gesundheitsfùrsorge kônnte einen wirksamen Beitrag zur Senkung des "moral hazard' darstellen. Um deren Auswirkungen in bezug auf die soziale Gerechtigkeit und ihre soziale Akzeptanz beurteilen zu kônnen, wurde ein Mikrosimulationsmodell erstellt. Die Hôhe einer fur aile Familien der Sozialversicherten gleichen Selbstbeteiligung, die als bescheidener Beitrag zur allgemeinen Kosteneinsparung festgelegt wird, wùrde sich auf etwa 1 .000 Franc pro Jahr und pro Familie belaufen. ErwartungsgemâB wùrde ein solches System die einkommensschwâchsten Familien benachteiligen. Dieser regressive Charakter kann durch die Festlegung eines individuellen Selbstbeteiligungsbetrages, bei dem die GrôBe und die Einkûnfte der Familien berùcksichtigt werden, abgeschwâcht werden. Durch eine Staffelung, insbesondere nach dem Einkommen der Personen, lâBt sich sogar eine grôBere Gerechtigkeit als beim ursprùnglichen System ohne Selbstbeteiligung erzielen. Angesichts dieser Hypothèse erweist sich der Schwellenwert, der den Familien der mittleren Einkommensklasse auferlegt wird, als entscheidende Variable bei der Verwirklichung des Ziels der sozialen Gerechtigkeit.

Suggested Citation

  • Claire Lachaud-Fiume & Christine Largeron-Leténo & Lise Rochaix-Ranson, 1998. "Franchise sur les soins ambulatoires et équité sociale," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 315(1), pages 51-72.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecstat:estat_0336-1454_1998_num_315_1_2641
    DOI: 10.3406/estat.1998.2641
    Note: DOI:10.3406/estat.1998.2641
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Lise Rochaix, 1995. "Le financement par les particuliers : La boîte de Pandore," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 34(3), pages 197-227.
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    5. Manning, Willard G, et al, 1987. "Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(3), pages 251-277, June.
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    1. Chantal Cases & Brigitte Dormont, 2012. "Introduction générale," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 455(1), pages 3-10.
    2. Gregoire Mercier & Jenica Pastor & Valerie Clément & Ulysse Rodts & Christine Moffat & Isabelle Quéré, 2019. "Out-of-pocket payments, vertical equity and unmet medical needs in France: A national multicenter prospective study on lymphedema," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(5), pages 1-13, May.
    3. Grégoire Mercier & Jenica Pastor & Valérie Clément & Ulysse Rodts & Christine Moffat & Isabelle Quéré, 2019. "Out-of-pocket payments, vertical equity and unmet medical needs in France: A national multicenter prospective study on lymphedema," Post-Print hal-02862217, HAL.

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