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Ouverture à la concurrence des monopoles énergétiques : analyse générale et étude du cas britannique

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  • Bertrand Mourre

Abstract

[fre] Ouverture à la concurrence des monopoles énergétiques : analyse générale et étude du cas britannique . par Bertrand Mourre . La déréglementation électrique en Europe pourra prendre à l' avenir plusieurs formes, dont on compare ici les avantages et les inconvénients : le Système de l'Acheteur Unique Intégré paraît efficace, car il intègre correctement la dimension du long terme et évite l'asymétrie d'information entre producteur et gestionnaire de réseau, mais il présente des inconvénients du point de vue de la concurrence. La situation est inverse pour l'Acheteur Unique Désintégré et l'Accès des Tiers au Réseau. . L'expérience britannique de dérégulation du gaz et de l'électricité est ensuite analysée. Elle apparaît relativement satisfaisante du point de vue de la concurrence et de la productivité. La programmation à long terme des investissements électrique reste toutefois une des faiblesse du système. [spa] Los monopolios energeticos se abren a la competencia : anâlisis general y estudio del caso britanic . por Bertrand Mourre . La desregulacion en el ârea de la energia eléctrica se proyecta en Europa de diversas maneras, cuyas ventajas y desventajas comparamos en este trabajo: el Sistema de Comprador Unico Integrado parece ser eficiente, pues intégra correctamente la dimension de largo plazo y évita la asimetrîa de la information entre productor y responsable de la gestion de la red, pero présenta inconvenientes desde el punto de vista de la competencia. La situaciôn inversa se establece en el caso del Comprador Unico Desintegrado y del Acceso de Terceros a la Red. . La experiencia britanica de desregulacion en el area del gaz y energia eléctrica se analiza mas adelante. Esta se présenta de manera satisfactoria desde el punto de vista de la competencia y de la productividad. La programaciôn de largo plazo de las inversiones en el ârea de la energia eléctrica constituye una de las insufïciencias del sistema. [ger] Die Ôffnung der Energiemonopole fur den Wettbewerb: allgemeine Analyse und Studie des britischen Falls . von Bertrand Mourre . Die Deregulierung der Elektrizitatswirtschaft in Europa wird in Zukunft mehrere Formen annehmen konnen, deren Vor- und Nachteile hier zunâchst miteinander verglichen werden: das System des Integrierten Einheiilichen Kâufers scheint zwar effizient zu sein, da es die Langfristdimension richtig beriicksichtigt und eine Informationsasymmetrie zwischen Erzeuger und Netzverwalter vermeidet, weist jedoch hinsichtlich des Wettbewerbs Nachteile auf. Fur den Desintegrierten Einheitlichen Kaufer und den Zugang von Dritten zum Netz ist die Lage gerade umgekehrt. Danach wird die britische Erfahrung bei der Deregulierung der Gas- und Elektrizitatswirtschaft analysiert. In bezug auf den Wettbewerb und die Produktivitat scheint sie relativ zufriedenstellend zu sein. Die langfristige Planung der Investitionen in der Elektrizitatswirtschaft ist allerdings nach wie vor eine der Schwàchen des Systems. [eng] Opening Up Energy Monopolies to Competition: General Analysis and Study of the British Experience . by Bertrand Mourre . The deregulation of electricity in Europe could take on a number of different forms in the future. This article compares the advantages and disadvantages of these forms. The integrated Single Buyer System appears to be efficient, as it correctly integrates the long-term consideration and avoids an asymmetry of information between the producer and the network manager. Yet it also has disadvantages from the point of view of competition. The situation is inverse for the Disintegrated Single Buyer system and the Access of Third Parties to the Network system. . The article then analyzes the British gas and electricity deregulation experience. This appears to be relatively satisfactory from the point of view of competition and productivity. Nevertheless, the long-term programming of electricity investments remains one of the system's weaknesses.

Suggested Citation

  • Bertrand Mourre, 1995. "Ouverture à la concurrence des monopoles énergétiques : analyse générale et étude du cas britannique," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 119(3), pages 87-105.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1995_num_119_3_5733
    DOI: 10.3406/ecop.1995.5733
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1995.5733
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joskow, Paul L, 1991. "The Role of Transaction Cost Economics in Antitrust and Public Utility Regulatory Policies," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 53-83, Special I.
    2. Richard Green & David Newbery, 1993. "The regulation of the gas industry: lessons from electricity," Fiscal Studies, Institute for Fiscal Studies, vol. 14(2), pages 37-52, August.
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