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Theoretical backgrounds of modern bank regulation
[Teoretické základy současné bankovní regulace]

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  • Petr Pavlík

Abstract

The article deals with theoretical and practical dimension of the third generation of Basel regulatory standards. The implementation proves more complex than previously supposed. Modern bank regulation theory focus mainly on four areas: factors that lies beyond bank equity pricing, transmission channels of banking crisis on the international level, optimal design of the safety net, well-balanced intensity of regulatory restrictions. Unfortunately, in the real world, bank regulation standards do not often follow the recommendations of economic theory. The rules remain to be subject of policy influence of diverse advocacy groups including banks themselves. The aim of this article is to outline the main ways of actual economic research and the challenges that lie ahead. Special attention is paid to such issues as capital adequacy, moral hazard and tax distorsion of debt financing. The influence of increased capital adequacy requirements, actual income tax policy and deregulation on the stability of commercial banks is being questioned within the study.

Suggested Citation

  • Petr Pavlík, 2016. "Theoretical backgrounds of modern bank regulation [Teoretické základy současné bankovní regulace]," Český finanční a účetní časopis, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2016(2), pages 5-33.
  • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlcfu:v:2016:y:2016:i:2:id:471:p:5-33
    DOI: 10.18267/j.cfuc.471
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank regulation; Capital adequacy; Moral hazard; Tax distorsion; Basel III; Bankovní regulace; Kapitálová přiměřenost; Morální hazard; Daňová distorze;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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