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Economic Rationality in the Ultimatum Game
[Ekonomická racionalita ve hře Ultimatum]

Author

Listed:
  • Jan Fiala
  • Oldřich Starý
  • Helena Fialová
  • Adéla Holasová
  • Martina Fialová

Abstract

Rigorous application of experimental methodology to the interdisciplinary research of economic decision making is the main purpose of our work. In this paper, we introduce the main decision-making theories and outline economic rationality. We explain why we find it useful to discriminate between the "irrational" and "non-rational" components of decision making. We offer an oriented interdisciplinary point of view on economic rationality. In the applied section, we describe the main features of the Ultimatum game and summarize the up-to-date theories explaining the non-rational course of the game. We discuss in detail the reported relations between the nominal value of the stakes and the distribution of the offers and responses. We introduce the blinded, randomized Ultimatum game experiment that we conducted in our laboratory. We stress the importance of anonymity of the study subjects and the difference in salience of a factual reward against a hypothetical reward. We present the results of our study, showing that a duly chosen non-monetary reward, directly inconvertible into money, leads to a different offer distribution in the Ultimatum game without the necessity to invest excessive sums of money in the rewards. We compare our results to research published by other authors. According to our theory, the rational, non-rational and irrational components contribute to the decision making in Ultimatum differently depending on the different reward stakes.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Fiala & Oldřich Starý & Helena Fialová & Adéla Holasová & Martina Fialová, 2017. "Economic Rationality in the Ultimatum Game [Ekonomická racionalita ve hře Ultimatum]," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2017(1), pages 64-78.
  • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlaop:v:2017:y:2017:i:1:id:569:p:64-78
    DOI: 10.18267/j.aop.569
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Hans P. Binswanger, 1980. "Attitudes Toward Risk: Experimental Measurement in Rural India," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 62(3), pages 395-407.
    2. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    ultimatum game; rational decision making; value; expected utility;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C9 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

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