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Teorías De La Evolución Del Comportamiento Cooperativo: Una Revisión Crítica

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  • RICARDO GUZMAN

    ()
    (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

  • ROBERT ROWTHORN

    ()
    (Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge and King’s College, Cambridge, UK)

  • CARLOS RODRÍGUEZ SICKERT

    ()
    (Escuela de Administración, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

Abstract

In this paper we survey the theories of gratuitous cooperation, i.e., in favour of non-relatives and without repeated interaction. We also describe our work on the area, whose objective is to integrate the various theories of gratuitous cooperation into a self-contained framework. Our conclusions are as follows. First: altruistic punishment, conformism, and gratuitous cooperation coevolve, and group selection is a necessary for the coevolution to take place. Second: people do not cooperate by mistake, as most theories imply. On the contrary, people knowingly sacrifice themselves for others. Third: in cooperative dilemmas conformism is an expression of preference, not a learning rule. Fourth: group mutations are necessary to sustain cooperation in the long-run.

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File URL: http://eacc10.puc.cl/files/ABT/Contenidos/Vol-11-N1/guzman.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. in its journal ABANTE.

Volume (Year): 11 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 3-18

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Handle: RePEc:pch:abante:v:11:y:2008:i:1:p:4-16

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Web page: http://eacc10.puc.cl/RePEc/pch/
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Keywords: Gratuitous cooperation; cooperative dilemma; altruistic punishment; conformism; group selection; group mutations.;

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  1. Fischbacher, Urs & Gachter, Simon & Fehr, Ernst, 2001. "Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 397-404, June.
  2. Marcus W. Feldman & Kenichi Aoki & Jochen Kumm, 1996. "Individual Versus Social Learning: Evolutionary Analysis in a Fluctuating Environment," Working Papers 96-05-030, Santa Fe Institute.
  3. Samuel Bowles & Astrid Hopfensitz, 2000. "The Co-evolution of Individual Behaviors and Social Institutions," Working Papers 00-12-073, Santa Fe Institute.
  4. Henrich, Joseph, 2004. "Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 3-35, January.
  5. Manishi Prasad & Peter Wahlqvist & Rich Shikiar & Ya-Chen Tina Shih, 2004. "A," PharmacoEconomics, Springer Healthcare | Adis, vol. 22(4), pages 225-244.
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