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Complex Securities and Underwriter Reputation: Do Reputable Underwriters Produce Better Securities?

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  • John Griffin
  • Richard Lowery
  • Alessio Saretto

Abstract

Conventional wisdom suggests that high-reputation banks will generally produce good securities to maintain their long-run reputation. We show with a simple model that, when securities are complex a high-reputation bank may produce assets that underperform during market downturns. We examine this possibility using a unique sample of $10.1 trillion of CLO, MBS, ABS, and CDOs. Contrary to the conventional view, securities issued by more reputable banks did not outperform but, rather, had higher proportions of capital in default.

Suggested Citation

  • John Griffin & Richard Lowery & Alessio Saretto, 2014. "Complex Securities and Underwriter Reputation: Do Reputable Underwriters Produce Better Securities?," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 27(10), pages 2872-2925.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:27:y:2014:i:10:p:2872-2925.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rfs/hhu030
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2020. "The job rating game: Revolving doors and analyst incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 41-67.
    2. Célérier, Claire & Vallée, Boris, 2016. "Catering to investors through product complexity," ESRB Working Paper Series 14, European Systemic Risk Board.
    3. Götze, Tobias & Gürtler, Marc, 2020. "Hard markets, hard times: On the inefficiency of the CAT bond market," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    4. Neuhann, Daniel, 2016. "Macroeconomic effects of secondary market trading," ESRB Working Paper Series 25, European Systemic Risk Board.
    5. Bhagat, Sanjai & Bolton, Brian, 2019. "Corporate governance and firm performance: The sequel," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 142-168.
    6. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2017. "The Job Rating Game: The Effects of Revolving Doors on Analyst Incentives," Working Papers 258, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    7. Elizabeth C. Klee & Chaehee Shin, 2020. "Post-crisis Signals in Securitization: Evidence from Auto ABS," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-042, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    8. Fredj Jawadi & Abdoulkarim Idi Cheffou & Nabila Jawadi & Wael Louhichi, 2016. "On the Reputation of Islamic Banks: a Panel Data Qualitative Econometrics Analysis," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 27(5), pages 987-998, November.
    9. Buss, Adrian & Vilkov, Grigory & Uppal, Raman, 2018. "The Implications of Financial Innovation for Capital Markets and Household Welfare," CEPR Discussion Papers 13137, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    10. Deku, Solomon Y. & Kara, Alper & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2019. "Do reputable issuers provide better-quality securitizations?," Working Paper Series 2236, European Central Bank.
    11. Zhengqing Gui & Yangguang Huang & Xiaojian Zhao, 2020. "Financial Fraud and Investor Awareness," HKUST CEP Working Papers Series 202002, HKUST Center for Economic Policy.
    12. Kara, Alper & Marques-Ibanez, David & Ongena, Steven, 2016. "Securitization and lending standards: Evidence from the European wholesale loan market," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 107-127.
    13. Carbó-Valverde, Santiago & Cuadros-Solas, Pedro J. & Rodríguez-Fernández, Francisco, 2021. "The impact of lending relationships on the choice and structure of bond underwriting syndicates," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).
    14. Zhang, Jinqing & Yin, Yiwen & Zhang, Linlin, 2019. "Determinants of loan securitization in Chinese banking: Cost-benefit-based analysis," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 57(C).
    15. Galanis, Spyros, 2018. "Financial complexity and trade," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 219-230.
    16. Liu, Wenzhen & Wu, Wenfeng, 2023. "Underwriter reputation and the pricing of securities: Evidence from asset-backed securities," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    17. Griffin, John M. & Kruger, Samuel & Maturana, Gonzalo, 2019. "Do labor markets discipline? Evidence from RMBS bankers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(3), pages 726-750.
    18. Neuhann, Daniel, 2017. "Macroeconomic effects of secondary market trading," Working Paper Series 2039, European Central Bank.
    19. John M. Griffin & Samuel Kruger & Prateek Mahajan, 2023. "Did FinTech Lenders Facilitate PPP Fraud?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(3), pages 1777-1827, June.

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