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Rational Dynamic Choice and Expected Utility Theory

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  • Cubitt, Robin P

Abstract

This paper considers the normative status of the independence and ordering principles of expected utility theory. Preferences are defined in terms of choice and the two principles derived from restrictions on choice in sequential decision problems. The results extend and clarify important contributions by P. J. Hammond and E. F. McClennen. They show that it is different requirements on dynamic choice which rationalize independence and ordering respectively and illuminate their relationship to consequentialism. Copyright 1996 by Royal Economic Society.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 48 (1996)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-19

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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:48:y:1996:i:1:p:1-19

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Cited by:
  1. John D. Hey, 2005. "Do People (Want To) Plan?," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 52(1), pages 122-138, 02.
  2. Guerrero, Ana M. & Herrero, Carmen, 2005. "A semi-separable utility function for health profiles," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 33-54, January.
  3. Maxim Pinkovskiy, 2009. "Rational Inattention and Choice Under Risk: Explaining Violations of Expected Utility Through a Shannon Entropy Formulation of the Costs of Rationality," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 37(1), pages 99-112, March.
  4. John Hey & Massimo Paradiso., . "Dynamic Choice and Timing-Independence: an experimental investigation," Discussion Papers 99/26, Department of Economics, University of York.
  5. Marciano Siniscalchi, 2006. "Dynamic Choice Under Ambiguity," Discussion Papers 1430, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Croson, Rachel T. A., 1999. "The Disjunction Effect and Reason-Based Choice in Games, , , , , , , , , , , , ," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 118-133, November.
  7. John Hey & Luca Panaccione, 2011. "Dynamic decision making: what do people do?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 85-123, April.
  8. Hammond, Peter J & Zank, Horst, 2013. "Rationality and Dynamic Consistency under Risk and Uncertainty," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1033, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.

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