Altruism, Matching, and Nonmarket Insurance
AbstractIncomplete market insurance gives rise to nonmarket arrangements for coinsurance. The authors find that the effort altruistically linked individuals take to avoid an accident increases with the degree of altruism. If the degree of altruism is sufficiently high, an economy with nonmarket insurance yields higher social welfare than an economy without nonmarket insurance. As altruism increases, the equilibrium level of effort approaches the second-best solution without the need for costly monitoring. Coinsurance is above (below) the socially optimal level if individuals place greater weight (less weight) on their own utility than on that of their partners. Copyright 1996 by Oxford University Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Western Economic Association International in its journal Economic Inquiry.
Volume (Year): 34 (1996)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
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- Chami, Ralph & Fullenkamp, Connel, 2002. "Trust and efficiency," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 26(9), pages 1785-1809, September.
- Jacques Bouhga-Hagbe, 2006. "Altruism and Workers' Remittances: Evidence from Selected Countries in the Middle East and Central Asia," IMF Working Papers 06/130, International Monetary Fund.
- Ho, Lok Sang, 1998. "A model of human nature and personal development," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 271-287.
- Dan Anderberg, 2003. "Voluntary income sharing and the design of unemployment insurance," Journal of Population Economics, Springer, vol. 16(1), pages 71-90, 02.
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