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Formal Child Care and Family Structure: Theory and Evidence

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  • Stefan Bauernschuster
  • Rainald Borck

Abstract

This article studies the effect of child care provision on family structure. We present a model of a marriage market with positive assortative matching, where in equilibrium, the poorest women stay single. Couples have to decide on the number of children and spousal specialization in home production of public goods and child care. We then study how child care provision affects the equilibrium. Due to specialization in home production, the incentive to use child care is smaller for married mothers than for single mothers. We show that this increases the number of single mothers and the divorce rate. Using survey data from Germany, we present suggestive empirical evidence consistent with this finding.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Bauernschuster & Rainald Borck, 2016. "Formal Child Care and Family Structure: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 62(4), pages 699-724.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:cesifo:v:62:y:2016:i:4:p:699-724.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/cesifo/ifv025
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stefan Bauernschuster & Timo Hener & Helmut Rainer, 2016. "Children Of A (Policy) Revolution: The Introduction Of Universal Child Care And Its Effect On Fertility," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 975-1005, August.
    2. Browning,Martin & Chiappori,Pierre-André & Weiss,Yoram, 2014. "Economics of the Family," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521795395.
    3. Dan Anderberg, 2007. "Marriage, Divorce and Reciprocity‐based Cooperation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 109(1), pages 25-47, March.
    4. Ribar, David C., 2004. "What Do Social Scientists Know About the Benefits of Marriage? A Review of Quantitative Methodologies," IZA Discussion Papers 998, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. Simon Chapple, 2009. "Child Well-Being and Sole-Parent Family Structure in the OECD: An Analysis," OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers 82, OECD Publishing.
    6. Justin Wolfers, 2006. "Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise Divorce Rates? A Reconciliation and New Results," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1802-1820, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Helmut Rainer & Clara Albrecht & Stefan Bauernschuster & Anita Fichtl & Timo Hener & Joachim Ragnitz & Anita Dietrich, 2018. "Deutschland 2017 - Studie zu den Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen der Bürgerinnen und Bürger im vereinigten Deutschland," ifo Forschungsberichte, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, number 96.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    marriage; divorce; single parenthood; child care;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J13 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Fertility; Family Planning; Child Care; Children; Youth

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