Institutions, Trade, and the Political Economy of Financial Development
AbstractWe study how financial development depends on trade openness and different types of institutions. In our model the elite can repress the financial market to keep their capital costs low and to preclude ordinary citizens from producing capital-intensive goods. Financial repression thus raises the price of these goods under autarky. For most world market prices, trade openness therefore makes financial repression less attractive and increases financial development. Better political institutions increase financial development by making financial repression more costly for the elite. Better contracting institutions have countervailing effects on financial development. These predictions are consistent with the existing empirical evidence.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 167 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
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- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- O16 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
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