The Political Economy of Tariffs and Environmental Standards
AbstractThis paper highlights the effects of the structures of games on interest groups' lobbying behavior. When policies are determined simultaneously, environmentalists prefer a higher tariff and a stricter environmental product standard, in order to hinder imports of a good that generate negative consumption-type externalities. In a sequential game, where the tariff is determined first, environmentalists will attempt to reduce the tariff. A reduction in the tariff tightens the environmental standard, which has a stronger trade-restrictive effect. To take advantage of the stronger trade-restrictive effect of environmental regulation, environmentalists will strategically lobby for a lower tariff barrier.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 161 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.mohr.de/jite
Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
- F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
- Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth
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- Per G. Fredriksson & Xenia Matschke, 2014.
"Trade Liberalization and Environmental Taxation in Federal Systems,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
4717, CESifo Group Munich.
- Per G. Fredriksson & Xenia Matschke, 2014. "Trade Liberalization and Environmental Taxation in Federal Systems," Research Papers in Economics 2014-04, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
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