Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China

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Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China

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Loren Brandt
Scott Rozelle
Matthew A. Turner

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Abstract

Secure land tenure is important to the development process, but China's rural reforms have so far failed to provide farm households with this security. We examine the political economy of land tenure and find that local governments sacrifice tenure security in the interests of efficiency and equity. Local rent seeking also plays an important role, and is a likely source of the under-development of land rental markets. Our results further suggest that decreases in distortionary taxes and increases in the integrity of elections will lead to more secure tenure and an increased reliance on market land exchange.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 160 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 627-
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Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200412)160:4_627:lgbapr_2.0.tx_2-x

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Paper
- Loren Brandt & Scott Rozelle & Matthew A. Turner, 2002. "Local Government Behavior and Property Right Formation in Rural China," Working Papers mturner-02-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Loren Brandt & Scott Rozelle & Matthew Turner, 2002. "Local Government Behavior and Property Rights Formation in Rural China," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Davis, Working Paper Series 1004, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Davis. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
R52 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Land Use and Other Regulations
Q13 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-37, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Gary S. Becker, 1984. "Public Policies, Pressure Groups, and Dead Weight Costs," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 35, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Loren Brandt & Matthew A. Turner, 2003. "The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections," Working Papers brandt-03-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
Other versions:
- Loren Brandt & Matthew Turner, 2003. "The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-602, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
- Loren Brandt & Matthew Turner, 2006. "The Usefulness of Corruptible Elections," Working Papers tecipa-233, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
Alan de Brauw & John Giles, 2006. "Migrant Opportunity and the Educational Attainment of Youth in Rural China," IZA Discussion Papers 2326, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Giles, John & de Brauw, Alan, 2008. "Migrant opportunity and the educational attainment of youth in rural China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4526, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
Andreas Kontoleon & Pauline Grosjean, 2007. "How Sustainable are Sustainable Development Programs? The Case of the Sloping Land Conversion Program in China," Environmental Economy and Policy Research Working Papers 26.2007, University of Cambridge, Department of Land Economics, revised 2007. [Downloadable!]
Jin, Songqing & Deininger, Klaus, 2007. "Land rental markets in the process of rural structural trans formation : productivity and equity impacts in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4454, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]

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