Organizational Form and Information Acquisition
AbstractIt has been shown by Sah and Stiglitz [1986, 1988] that organizational form crucially affects societal information aggregation. This paper demonstrates that organizational form also crucially affects the incentives to acquire information. It is shown that relative allocative properties of organizations identified by Sah and Stiglitz can be reversed once endogenous information acquisition is possible. Implications for research joint ventures are discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.
Volume (Year): 160 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Postal: Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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