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Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: The Life of a Competition Authority Among Sectoral Regulators

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Author Info
Hoernig, Steffen
Nilssen, Tore
Pita Barros, Pedro Luis

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Abstract

Competition authorities must pay attention to many industries simultaneously. Sectoral regulators concentrate on their own industry. Often both types of authority may intervene in specific industries and there is an overlap of jurisdictions. We show how a competition authority’s resource allocation is affected by its relationships with sectoral regulators and their biases. If agencies collaborate (compete), the competition authority spends more effort on the industry with the more (less) consumer-biased sectoral regulator. The competition authority spends budget increases on the industry whose regulator reacts less to more effort. The socially optimal budget corrects for distortions due to regulatory bias, but only downwards.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6861.

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Date of creation: Jun 2008
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:6861

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Related research
Keywords: Competition authority; Regulatory bias; Sectoral regulators;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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  1. Martin F. Grace & Richard D. Phillips, 2007. "The Allocation of Governmental Regulatory Authority: Federalism and the Case of Insurance Regulation," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 74(1), pages 207-238. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Martimort, David, 1999. "The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(4), pages 929-47, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Thomas P. Gehrig, 2004. "Organizational Form and Information Acquisition," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 160(1), pages 39-, March.
  4. Barros, Pedro Pita & Hoernig, Steffen, 2004. "Sectoral Regulators and the Competition Authority: Which Relationship is Best?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4541, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Martimort, David, 1999. "Renegotiation Design with Multiple Regulators," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 261-293, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Martimort, David, 1996. "The multiprincipal nature of government," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 673-685, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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