Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: The Life of a Competition Authority Among Sectoral Regulators
AbstractCompetition authorities must pay attention to many industries simultaneously. Sectoral regulators concentrate on their own industry. Often both types of authority may intervene in specific industries and there is an overlap of jurisdictions. We show how a competition authority’s resource allocation is affected by its relationships with sectoral regulators and their biases. If agencies collaborate (compete), the competition authority spends more effort on the industry with the more (less) consumer-biased sectoral regulator. The competition authority spends budget increases on the industry whose regulator reacts less to more effort. The socially optimal budget corrects for distortions due to regulatory bias, but only downwards.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 6861.
Date of creation: Jun 2008
Date of revision:
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Other versions of this item:
- Barros, Pedro P. & Hoernig, Steffen & Nilssen, Tore, 2008. "Keeping Both Eyes Wide Open: The Life of a Competitive Authority among Sectoral Regulators," Memorandum 12/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-06-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2008-06-21 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-REG-2008-06-21 (Regulation)
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