This paper develops a theoretical model that determines the optimal ownership arrangement in an imperfect market and government institutional environment, especially in transitional economies. It studies the interdependence of institutional environments and ownership arrangements. The theory developed sheds some light on predicting how the transition from a command economy to a free market economy takes place. It shows that an ownership arrangement may not be changed effectively without changing economic and political institutional environments.
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Volume (Year): 157 (2001) Issue (Month): 3 (September) Pages: 380- Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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