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Commitment, Deficit Ceiling, and Fiscal Privilege

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  • Toshihiro Ihori

Abstract

This study analyzes how commitment to a deficit ceiling can affect private agents´ political efforts, as well as overall welfare, in a hard- and a soft-budget regime, using a two-period model simulating a present and a future generation and a government. In the hard-budget regime, the government imposes the deficit ceiling before the present generation´s interest group decides the quantity of personal fiscal privileges. Since in the soft-budget regime the government cannot commit itself to the deficit ceiling ex ante, the present generation exerts intense political efforts for personal fiscal privileges. We explore the interesting possibility that the soft-budget regime leads to an overall welfare reduction for both generations, and hence, the commitment to a deficit ceiling benefits even rent-seeking private agents.

Suggested Citation

  • Toshihiro Ihori, 2014. "Commitment, Deficit Ceiling, and Fiscal Privilege," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 70(4), pages 511-526, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:finarc:urn:sici:0015-2218(201412)70:4_511:cdcafp_2.0.tx_2-s
    DOI: 10.1628/001522108X685465
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Takero Doi & Toshihiro Ihori, 2009. "The Public Sector in Japan," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12752.
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    7. Toshihiro Ihori, 2011. "Overlapping tax revenue, soft budget, and rent seeking," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(1), pages 36-55, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Toshihiro Ihori, 2015. "Flexibility of Deficit Ceiling and Income Fluctuation," Public Policy Review, Policy Research Institute, Ministry of Finance Japan, vol. 11(2), pages 231-246, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    deficit ceiling; fiscal privilege; soft budget; hard budget; commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus

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