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Corruption Forms and Heath Care Provision in Douala Metropolis Public Hospitals of Cameroon

Author

Listed:
  • Benjamin YAMB

    (Advanced School of Economics and Commerce (ESSEC), University of Douala, P.O Box 1931, Cameroon.)

  • Oscar BAYEMI

    (Faculty of Economics and Applied Management (FSEGA), University of Douala, P.O Box 2701, Cameroon.)

Abstract

This study analyzes and highlights the most practised forms of corruption in public hospitals of Douala metropolis in Cameroon, namely corruption with theft and that without theft. The results of our analyzes show a predominance of the form without theft, this regardless of the hospital, and this allowed us to classify hospitals based on the dominant form. It appears that the General and Deido Hospitals are health facilities where corruption without theft is the least and the most practiced respectively, while the Cité des Palmiers and New Bell hospitals are those where corruption with theft is the least and the most practiced. An estimate through odds ratios revealed for instance that the odds would be about 5.46 times higher that the form without theft is not practiced at the General hospital compared to other hospitals, and about 11.11 times that it is practiced at Deido hospital compared to all hospitals.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin YAMB & Oscar BAYEMI, 2017. "Corruption Forms and Heath Care Provision in Douala Metropolis Public Hospitals of Cameroon," Turkish Economic Review, KSP Journals, vol. 4(1), pages 96-105, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksp:journ2:v:4:y:2017:i:1:p:96-105
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Benjamín YAMB & Oscar BAYEMI, 2016. "Bribery in Cameroonian Public Hospitals: Who Pays and How Much?," Asian Journal of Social Sciences and Management Studies, Asian Online Journal Publishing Group, vol. 3(1), pages 7-17.
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    Cited by:

    1. Benjamin YAMB & Oscar BAYEMI, 2017. "Corruption and discrimination in Douala metropolis public hospitals of Cameroon," Journal of Economics Library, KSP Journals, vol. 4(4), pages 502-513, December.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption forms; Health system; Odds ratio; Cameroon.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • I14 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health and Inequality
    • I15 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health and Economic Development

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