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Nyerhet-e mindenki az újraelosztásban?. Kötelező biztosítás és aszimmetrikus információ
[Can everybody win by redistribution?. Compulsory insurance and asymmetrical information]

Author

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  • Simonovits, András

Abstract

Rothschild-Stiglitz [1976] elsősorban a semleges (újraelosztás nélküli) biztosítást vizsgálta aszimmetrikus információ esetén. Alapmodelljében a biztosító nem ismeri fel, hogy a biztosított kicsi vagy nagy kockázatú, ezért a kis kockázatú egyéneknek olyan nagy önrészesedést kell vállalniuk, amely a nagy kockázatúakat visszatartja attól, hogy kis kockázatúaknak tüntessék fel magukat (második legjobb megoldás). A szerzőpáros egy modellváltozatban az optimális kereszttámogatást is vizsgálja, ami azonban eléggé elsikkad az irodalomban. Tanulmányom kiterjeszti az elemzést a kötelező és újraelosztó biztosítás esetére, és igazolja, hogy itt mindkét típusnak érdemes teljes biztosítást kötnie, de mindenkinek az átlagos kockázatot kell fizetnie. Nagy kockázatkerülés vagy nagy kár, vagy viszonylag kevés nagy kockázatú egyén esetén az újraelosztás nemcsak a nagy kockázatú típus, de a kis kockázatú típus hasznosságát is növeli: a második legjobb újraelosztás Pareto-dominálja a semleges megoldást. Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: D02, D82, H2, I38.

Suggested Citation

  • Simonovits, András, 2006. "Nyerhet-e mindenki az újraelosztásban?. Kötelező biztosítás és aszimmetrikus információ [Can everybody win by redistribution?. Compulsory insurance and asymmetrical information]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 873-879.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:873
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Diamond, P. A. & Mirrlees, J. A., 1978. "A model of social insurance with variable retirement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(3), pages 295-336, December.
    2. Matthew Rabin, 2000. "Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1281-1292, September.
    3. Amy Finkelstein & James Poterba, 2004. "Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U.K. Annuity Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(1), pages 183-208, February.
    4. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680, Decembrie.
    5. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Bernard Salanie, 2000. "Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(1), pages 56-78, February.
    6. Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
    7. J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
    8. Simonovits, András, 2004. "Optimális rugalmas nyugdíjrendszer tervezése - biztosításmatematikai semlegesség és hatékonyság [Designing benefit rules for flexible retirement: actuarial fairness versus efficiency]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(12), pages 1101-1112.
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    1. Berlinger, Edina & Juhász, Péter & Lovas, Anita, 2015. "Az állami támogatás hatása a projektfinanszírozásra erkölcsi kockázat és pozitív externáliák mellett. Szerződéselméleti megközelítés [The impact of state subsidy on project financing under moral ha," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 139-171.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs

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