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Dinamikus árazás az elektronikus piactereken
[Dynamic pricing on electronic markets]

Author

Listed:
  • Szabó, Katalin
  • Kocsis, Éva

Abstract

Napjainkban az elektronikus piactereken rég elfelejtett alkudozási formák élednek újra, s megtörni látszik a vevők árdiktátumoknak való kiszolgáltatottsága. Csak néhány kattintás az egérrel, és bármelyik vevő áttekintheti a teljes piaci kínálatot. Így a mikroökonómiai tankönyvek szélső esetéből a mindennapok gyakorlatává válhat a tökéletes verseny, s néhány elektronikusan adható-vehető jószág piacán jelentősen eshetnek az árak. A 20. század utolsó évtizedéig stabilan fennálló „ármeghatározó” és „árelfogadó” szereposztás is megváltozik a tetszőleges számú vevő egyidejű bekapcsolódását lehetővé tevő elektronikus aukciókon. Mindezek ellenére a nagyvállalatok a virtuális térben is hamar rátalálnak azokra a megoldásokra, amelyekkel újra szegmentálhatják a piacokat, mérsékelhetik transzparenciáit, és ahelyett hogy ők versenyeznének a vevők kegyéért, inkább vevőiket versenyeztetik. Emellett olyan árazási szoftvereket telepítenek a hálóra, amelyek a bejelentkező vevők adataiból megbecsülik fizetési hajlandóságukat, s ezáltal lehetővé teszik a profitok „optimalizálását”. A szégyenlősen „jövedelemmenedzsmentnek” nevezett módszerrel elejét veszik annak, hogy olcsóbban adják termékeiket annál, mint amennyit a fogyasztó hajlandó adni értük. A szerzők a tömeges testre szabás kialakulófélben levő új termelési módjának kontextusába helyezve mutatják be a dinamikus árképzés - ma még kissé ellentmondásos - előretörését. Az árazásról csak egyet tudhatunk biztosan: a rögzített „költség ” ár dominanciája lassan véget ér.** Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: D4.

Suggested Citation

  • Szabó, Katalin & Kocsis, Éva, 2002. "Dinamikus árazás az elektronikus piactereken [Dynamic pricing on electronic markets]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 858-874.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:565
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Csekő, Imre, 1996. "Választás és mechanizmus. Felületes ismerkedés az implementációelmélettel [Selection and mechanism. Getting superficially acquainted with the implementation theory]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(5), pages 420-430.
    2. Hurwicz, Leonid, 1973. "The Design of Mechanisms for Resource Allocation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 1-30, May.
    3. Bichler,Martin, 2001. "The Future of e-Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521003834.
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    JEL classification:

    • D4 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design

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