Some Considerations About a Uunified System for the Voting Procedres of the European Union
AbstractThe paper analyses the evolution of the decision making process within the EU and assesses the effectiveness of the European voting procedures in the context of current and potential future enlargement. Based on a simulation model, we discussed some different scenarios of the voting procedures’ results within the EU, both for the Council and the Parliament of the European Union. A special attention was paid to the evolution of the voting model in the interval 2009-2050. The paper evaluated the advantages and disadvantages of the different voting systems. We have emphasis all the positive effects of the Penrose square root rule. Despite the criticism formulated around the Penrose model, it remains the only valid model for an effective voting system in the main EU decision-making bodies.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Faculty of Finance, Banking and Accountancy Bucharest,"Dimitrie Cantemir" Christian University Bucharest in its journal Knowledge Horizons - Economics.
Volume (Year): 1 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Voting game; voting weight; voting power; Penrose square root rule; Council; Parliament;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
- O52 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Europe
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
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