The power of a collectivity to act in weighted voting games with many small voters
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 30 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (May)
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Web page: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00355/index.htm
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- Moshé Machover & Dan S. Felsenthal, 2001. "The Treaty of Nice and qualified majority voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 431-464.
- Laruelle, Annick & Valenciano, Federico, 2007. "Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 291-305, January.
- Baldwin, Richard & Berglöf, Erik & Giavazzi, Francesco & Widgrén, Mika, 2000. "EU Reforms for Tomorrow’s Europe," CEPR Discussion Papers 2623, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2008. "Measuring influence in command games," Post-Print halshs-00344805, HAL.
- Roy, Sonali, 2008. "The exact lower bound for the Coleman index of the power of a collectivity for a special class of simple majority games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 296-300, September.
- Michel Grabisch & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2009. "Measuring influence in command games," Post-Print halshs-00445126, HAL.
- Pritchard, Geoffrey & Reyhani, Reyhaneh & Wilson, Mark C., 2013. "Power measures derived from the sequential query process," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 174-180.
- Pavel Doležel, 2011. "Optimizing the Efficiency of Weighted Voting Games," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 306-323, November.
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