The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.
Volume (Year): 67 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341
voting rules; Condorcet efficieny; single-peaked preferences; D7;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- William Gehrlein, 2005. "Probabilities of election outcomes with two parameters: The relative impact of unifying and polarizing candidates," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 317-336, December.
- Berg, Sven, 1985. "A note on plurality distortion in large committees," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 271-284.
- Dominique Lepelley, 1994. "Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 289-299, December.
- Gehrlein, William V. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 38-49, October.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2006.
"On Ehrhart Polynomials and Probability Calculations in Voting Theory,"
Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen)
200610, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2008. "On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 363-383, April.
- Gehrlein, William V., 1982. "Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 123-130, March.
- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 1999. "Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 471-490.
- William Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2010. "On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 1-23, June.
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