The Unexpected Behavior of Plurality Rule
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Theory and Decision.
Volume (Year): 67 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100341
voting rules; Condorcet efficieny; single-peaked preferences; D7;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- William Gehrlein, 2005. "Probabilities of election outcomes with two parameters: The relative impact of unifying and polarizing candidates," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 317-336, December.
- Gehrlein, William V. & Fishburn, Peter C., 1978. "Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 38-49, October.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2008.
"On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory,"
Social Choice and Welfare,
Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 363-383, April.
- Dominique Lepelley & Ahmed Louichi & Hatem Smaoui, 2006. "On Ehrhart Polynomials and Probability Calculations in Voting Theory," Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen) 200610, Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes 1, University of Caen and CNRS.
- Berg, Sven, 1985. "A note on plurality distortion in large committees," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 271-284.
- Dominique Lepelley, 1994. "Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 289-299, December.
- Gehrlein, William V., 1982. "Condorcet efficiency and constant scoring rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 123-130, March.
- William V. Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 1999. "Condorcet efficiencies under the maximal culture condition," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 471-490.
- William Gehrlein & Dominique Lepelley, 2010. "On the probability of observing Borda’s paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 1-23, June.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Guenther Eichhorn) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.