Obtaining representations for probabilities of voting outcomes with effectively unlimited precision integer arithmetic
AbstractA procedure is developed to obtain representations for the probability of election outcomes with the Impartial Anonymous Culture Condition and the Maximal Culture Condition. The procedure is based upon a process of performing arithmetic with integers, while maintaining absolute precision with very large integer numbers. The procedure is then used to develop probability representations for a number of different voting outcomes, which have to date been considered to be intractable to obtain with the use of standard algebraic techniques.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Social Choice and Welfare.
Volume (Year): 19 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Note: Received: 13 June 2000/Accepted: 22 January 2001
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