Time-inconsistent risk preferences in a laboratory experiment
AbstractWe conduct an experiment to explore the time-consistency of risk preferences in a multi-period betting game. Specifically, subjects planned their contingent betting decisions in advance then played the game dynamically later to determine whether their respective decisions matched. We find that subjects took more risk than planned in their initial bet and after losses. In addition, this increased risk was associated with an increase in breakeven mental accounting. Our findings indicate that immediacy of outcomes can lead to impulsive risk-taking behavior and highlight the importance of precommitment to long-term financial planning. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2012
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting.
Volume (Year): 39 (2012)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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Web page: http://springerlink.metapress.com/link.asp?id=102990
Experimental economics; Time inconsistency; Risk preference; Mental accounting; Behavioral finance; C91; D81; G14;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
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