Not just guidelines: Pirate codes and the emergence of property rights in The Invisible Hook
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal The Review of Austrian Economics.
Volume (Year): 23 (2010)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100335
Pirates; Evolution of property rights; K11; P14;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- P14 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Property Rights
- I - Health, Education, and Welfare
- A - General Economics and Teaching
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Merrill, Thomas W, 2002. "Introduction: The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 31(2), pages S331-38, June.
- Mark Roodhouse, 2009. "The invisible hook: the hidden economics of pirates," Business History, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 51(6), pages 973-975.
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