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Incentives and Government Relief for Risk Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Kaplow, Louis
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Government relief is offered for a wide range of risks--natural disaster, economic dislocation, sickness, and injury. This article explores the effect of such relief on incentives and the allocation of risk in a model with private insurance. It is shown that government relief is inefficient, even when its level is less than the private insurance coverage that individuals would otherwise have purchased and even when private insurance coverage is incomplete due to problems of moral hazard. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Risk and Uncertainty .
Volume (Year): 4 (1991)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 167-75
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Handle: RePEc:kap:jrisku:v:4:y:1991:i:2:p:167-75Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100299
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983.
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