When Should an Incumbent be Obliged to Share its Infrastructure with an Entrant Under the General Competition Rules?
AbstractAccording to the essential-facilities doctrine, competition law requires an infrastructural monopoly to provide access. Under the “Bronner criterion”, proposed by the EC Court, the doctrine is only applicable when a symmetric infrastructural duopoly is non-viable. This paper uses a simple model to illustrate that, from a welfare point-of-view, the Bronner criterion may provide too little monopoly protection for the incumbent in high-risk new markets, while requiring too much investments from the entrant in low-risk mature markets. Copyright Springer Science Business Media, Inc. 2005
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Springer in its journal Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade.
Volume (Year): 5 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://springerlink.metapress.com/link.asp?id=105724
infrastructure; access regulation; competition law; antitrust; bronner;
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