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Preisregulierung zum Schutz der Verbraucher: Wirkungen auf Werbung und Wohlfahrt

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  • Torsten Steinrücken
  • Sebastian Jaenichen

Abstract

Aiming for protection of consumers the EU has recently implemented direct price regulation in cellular mobile telephony and has announced plans to intensify such regulation in the near future. Using a simple model we examine the welfare effect of a price regulation on the targeted firm's advertisement expenditure. It is shown that sheer price regulation increases welfare only on a small scale. Due to the fact that a price regulation limits the free choice of both marketing instruments: price and (implicitly) advertisement, the enterprise adopts its use of these instruments causing a constriction of the market. Our model shows that price regulation may fail to enhance welfare if the enterprise advertises its products actively while being unregulated. We show that there is an optimal intensity of regulation that depends on the effectiveness of the marketing policies undertaken by the targeted enterprise. In jüngster Zeit hat die EU mit Argumenten des Verbraucherschutzes direkte Preisregulierungen im Mobilfunkbereich durchgesetzt und wird diese in Zukunft noch verschärfen. Unter Zuhilfenahme eines einfachen Modells wird im vorliegenden Beitrag gezeigt, welchen Einfluss derartige Preisregulierung auf die gesamtwirtschaftliche Wohlfahrt ausübt, wenn der Adressat der Regulierung neben dem Preis auch über den Aktionsparameter Werbung verfügt. Die Modellergebnisse zeigen, dass der Wohlfahrtszuwachs sehr gering ausfällt, wenn nur ein Aktionsparameter reguliert wird. Diese geringe Wirksamkeit ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass eine Absenkung des Preises durch staatliche Regulierung das Werbevolumen vermindert und damit den Markt verkleinert. Vor dem Hintergrund der Modellergebnisse erscheint es wohlfahrtsökonomisch sinnvoll, entweder auf eine Preisregulierung zu verzichten, wenn die regulierten Unternehmen in der unregulierten Situation hohe Werbeaufwendungen tätigen, oder stärker den Einsatz absatzpolitischer Instrumente bei der Regulierung zu berücksichtigen, also den Einsatz der Werbung ebenfalls zu regulieren.

Suggested Citation

  • Torsten Steinrücken & Sebastian Jaenichen, 2009. "Preisregulierung zum Schutz der Verbraucher: Wirkungen auf Werbung und Wohlfahrt," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 78(3), pages 188-201.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diwvjh:78-3-12
    DOI: 10.3790/vjh.78.3.188
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Advertising; price-regulation; welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • R38 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Government Policy
    • I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being

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