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The Effects of Compensation Structures and Monetary Rewards on Managers’ Decisions to Blow the Whistle

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  • Jacob M. Rose

    (Victoria University of Wellington)

  • Alisa G. Brink

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

  • Carolyn Strand Norman

    (Virginia Commonwealth University)

Abstract

Recent research indicates that compensation structure can be used by firms to discourage their employees from whistleblowing. We extend the ethics literature by examining how compensation structures and financial rewards work together to influence managers’ decisions to blow the whistle. Results from an experiment indicate that compensation with restricted stock, relative to stock payments that lack restrictions, can enhance the likelihood that managers will blow the whistle when large rewards are available. However, restricted stock can also threaten the effectiveness of whistleblowing systems without the presence of large financial rewards for whistleblowing. Thus, the large potential rewards for whistleblowing enacted by the Dodd–Frank Act appear timely as firms are moving toward compensation agreements that include greater proportions of restricted stock.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacob M. Rose & Alisa G. Brink & Carolyn Strand Norman, 2018. "The Effects of Compensation Structures and Monetary Rewards on Managers’ Decisions to Blow the Whistle," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 853-862, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:150:y:2018:i:3:d:10.1007_s10551-016-3222-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s10551-016-3222-7
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    Cited by:

    1. Waseem Yousaf & Raheel Jamil, 2020. "Does Moral Intensity Affect the Whistleblowing Intentions?," iRASD Journal of Management, International Research Alliance for Sustainable Development (iRASD), vol. 2(2), pages 84-99, December.
    2. Sebastian Oelrich, 2019. "Making regulation fit by taking irrationality into account: the case of the whistleblower," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 12(1), pages 175-207, April.
    3. Hengky Latan & Charbel Jose Chiappetta Jabbour & Ana Beatriz Lopes de Sousa Jabbour, 2021. "Social Media as a Form of Virtual Whistleblowing: Empirical Evidence for Elements of the Diamond Model," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 174(3), pages 529-548, December.
    4. Brink, Alisa G. & Eller, C. Kevin & Gao, Lei, 2021. "He wouldn't, but I would: The effects of pronoun-induced language vividness in whistleblowing policies," Advances in accounting, Elsevier, vol. 54(C).

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