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Bulgakov's Economic Man—Re-thinking the Construction of Capitalist Economic Ethics Theory

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  • Hsiang Lin

Abstract

An economic man, i.e., the leading role in economic ethics, has been deeply investigated in our study considering a human being’s economic behavior and the hypotheses for an economic man in traditional economics based on M. Weber’s and S. N. Bulgakov’s Christian economic man. Among various channels to study business ethics and economic ethics, we chose the definition of an economic man given by Weber and Bulgakov to review a hypothesis about a rational economic man in economics and discussed L. von Mises’s and A. Sen’s contentions for an economic man’s substantive freedom and innermost being. The issue deserved to be further investigated by scholars who concern business ethics and economic ethics consists in reconciling egotism and altruism commonly embedded in an economic man’s heart and boosting more altruistic economic men. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

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  • Hsiang Lin, 2014. "Bulgakov's Economic Man—Re-thinking the Construction of Capitalist Economic Ethics Theory," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 121(2), pages 189-202, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jbuset:v:121:y:2014:i:2:p:189-202
    DOI: 10.1007/s10551-013-1695-1
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    1. Sen, Amartya, 1983. "Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198284635.
    2. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    4. Sen, Amartya, 1997. "On Economic Inequality," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198292975.
    5. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1998. "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1), pages 1-90.
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    1. > Economics Profession > Ethics in Economics

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    2. Riana Iren RADU & Iuliana Oana MIHAI, 2017. "Approaches Regarding the Application of ISQC1 and ISA 220 in the Audit Activity," Proceedings RCE 2017, Editura Lumen, pages 146-156, November.

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