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Can an Unemployment Insurance System Generate Multiple Natural Rates?

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  • Guillaume Rocheteau

Abstract

This article studies some macroeconomic consequences of the financing of an unemployment insurance scheme. Under a balanced-budget rule, when both taxes and unemployment benefits are proportional to wages, the existence of multiple natural rates of unemployment is a generic property of the matching model. Government can lead the economy to a high equilibrium by fixing the rate of tax on wages and then setting the replacement ratio so that its expenditure matches its receipts. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1999

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1008759602591
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 6 (1999)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 379-387

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Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:6:y:1999:i:3:p:379-387

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

Related research

Keywords: matching model; multiple equilibria; unemployment;

References

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  1. Saint-Paul, Gilles, 1992. "The High Unemployment Trap," CEPR Discussion Papers 670, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Pissarides, Christopher A., 1998. "The impact of employment tax cuts on unemployment and wages; The role of unemployment benefits and tax structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 155-183, January.
  3. Cooper, Russell & John, Andrew, 1988. "Coordinating Coordination Failures in Keynesian Models," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(3), pages 441-63, August.
  4. Ross D. Milbourne & Douglas D. Purvis & W. David Scoones, 1991. "Unemployment Insurance and Unemployment Dynamics," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(4), pages 804-26, November.
  5. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October.
  6. Atkinson, Anthony B & Micklewright, John, 1991. "Unemployment Compensation and Labor Market Transitions: A Critical Review," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 29(4), pages 1679-1727, December.
  7. Rocheteau, Guillaume, 1999. "Balanced-Budget Rules and Indeterminacy of the Equilibrium Unemployment Rate," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 399-409, July.
  8. Blanchard, Olivier Jean & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Beyond the Natural Rate Hypothesis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(2), pages 182-87, May.
  9. Weitzman, Martin L, 1982. "Increasing Returns and the Foundations of Unemployment Theory," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(368), pages 787-804, December.
  10. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1992. "Loss of Skill during Unemployment and the Persistence of Employment Shocks," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 107(4), pages 1371-91, November.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Florian Baumann & Nikolai Stähler, 2006. "Financing Unemployment Benefits: Dismissal versus Employment Taxes," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 20(3), pages 433-451, 09.
  2. Julie Beugnot & Mabel Tidball, 2009. "A Multiple Equilibria Model with Intrafirm Bargaining and Matching Frictions," Working Papers 09-11, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2009.
  3. James W. Boudreau, 2008. "Sequential Pre-Marital Investment Games: Implications for Unemployment," Working papers 2008-45, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  4. Helge Sanner, 2001. "Regional Unemployment Insurance," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 41, Universität Potsdam, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät.

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