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Common labor market, attachment and spillovers in a large metropolis

Author

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  • Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva

    (University of Alberta)

  • Vander Mendes Lucas

    (University of Brasilia)

Abstract

In this paper, we extend the home-attachment model to a setting with multiple (more than two) jurisdictions and consider non-cooperative policy making for provision of different types of metropolitan public goods in the presence of a common labor market. Migration and working place choices are independent. We show that the optimal redistributive policy implemented by a central authority always yields equalization of private consumption levels across jurisdictions. This result holds whether or not policy makers are able to anticipate migration responses to their policy choices. In the decentralized leadership games, jurisdictions make choices that fully internalize externalities.

Suggested Citation

  • Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva & Vander Mendes Lucas, 2016. "Common labor market, attachment and spillovers in a large metropolis," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 23(4), pages 693-715, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:23:y:2016:i:4:d:10.1007_s10797-016-9401-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10797-016-9401-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    14. Naoto Aoyama & Emilson C. D. Silva, 2010. "Equitable and Efficient Federal Structures with Decentralized Leadership, Spillovers, and Attachment of Heterogeneous Labor," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(2), pages 323-343, April.
    15. Silva, Emilson Caputo Delfino, 2014. "Selective decentralized leadership," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-5.
    16. Caplan, Arthur J. & Cornes, Richard C. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 2000. "Pure public goods and income redistribution in a federation with decentralized leadership and imperfect labor mobility," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 265-284, August.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thierry MADIÈS & Emmanuelle TAUGOURDEAU, 2019. "Decentralized leadership in a federation with competition for mobile firms: Does economic integration matter?," Working Papers 2019-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    2. Thierry Madiès & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2017. "Decentralized leadership in a federation and competition for mobile firms: Does economic integration matter?," Working Papers 2017-73, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    3. João Ricardo Faria & Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva, 2020. "Leadership delegation in rotten kid families," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 33(2), pages 441-460, April.
    4. Thierry Madiès & Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2020. "Vertical transfers and tax competition: does trade integration matter?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 55(3), pages 453-475, October.
    5. Emilson C.D. Silva, 2016. "Decentralized Leadership," CESifo Working Paper Series 6064, CESifo.
    6. João Ricardo Faria & Emilson C.D. Silva, 2017. "Optimal Timing in Rotten Kid Families," CESifo Working Paper Series 6333, CESifo.
    7. Naoto Aoyama & Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva, 2023. "Efficient Decentralized Leadership under Hybrid Work and Attachment to Regions," Games, MDPI, vol. 14(2), pages 1-18, March.
    8. Thierry MADIÈS & Emmanuelle TAUGOURDEAU, 2019. "Decentralized leadership in a federation with competition for mobile firms: Does economic integration matter?," Working Papers 2019-24, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Common labor market; Home attachment; Spillovers; Decentralized leadership;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
    • H42 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Publicly Provided Private Goods
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods
    • R3 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location
    • R5 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis

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