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Price efficiency and trading behavior in limit order markets with competing insiders

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  • Thomas Stöckl

Abstract

We study price efficiency and trading behavior in laboratory limit order markets with asymmetrically informed traders. Markets differ in the number of insiders present and in the subset of traders who receive information about the number of insiders present. We observe that price efficiency (i) is the higher the higher the number of insiders in the market but (ii) is unaffected by changes in the subset of traders who know about the number of insiders present. (iii) Independent of the number of insiders, price efficiency increases gradually over time. (iv) The insiders’ information is reflected in prices via limit (market) orders if the asset’s value is inside (outside) the bid-ask spread. (v) In situations where limit and market orders yield positive profits, insiders clearly prefer market orders, indicating a strong desire for immediate transactions. Copyright Economic Science Association 2014

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  • Thomas Stöckl, 2014. "Price efficiency and trading behavior in limit order markets with competing insiders," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 314-334, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:expeco:v:17:y:2014:i:2:p:314-334
    DOI: 10.1007/s10683-013-9369-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Michael Razen & Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler, 2016. "Cash Inflow and Trading Horizon in Asset Markets," Working Papers 2016-06, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insider; Competition; Asset market; Price efficiency; Trading behavior; Experimental economics; C92; D82; G12; G14;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading

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