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Price Formation and Market Quality When the Number and Presence of Insiders Is Unknown

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  • Charles R. Schnitzlein

Abstract

In most models of market microstructure tractability requires that all market participants know the number (and presence) of competing insiders. I drop this assumption in experimental asset markets. Outcomes are qualitatively consistent with theoretical models when the number of insiders is disclosed prior to trade. When it is not, insiders use the timing and size of trades interactively to hide from the dealers and each other, dealers have difficulty identifying insider trades, and liquidity patterns do not differ as a function of the number of insiders. In general, insider behavior has strategic dimensions not admitted in Kyle (1985) and extensions. Copyright 2002, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles R. Schnitzlein, 2002. "Price Formation and Market Quality When the Number and Presence of Insiders Is Unknown," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 15(4), pages 1077-1109.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:15:y:2002:i:4:p:1077-1109
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Stöckl, 2013. "Price efficiency and trading behavior in limit order markets with competing insiders," Working Papers 2013-11, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    2. Nuzzo, Simone & Morone, Andrea, 2017. "Asset markets in the lab: A literature review," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 42-50.
    3. Halim, Edward & Riyanto, Yohanes E., 2020. "Asset markets with insider trading disclosure rule and reselling constraint: An experimental analysis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
    4. Palan, Stefan & Stöckl, Thomas, 2017. "When chasing the offender hurts the victim: The case of insider legislation," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 104-129.
    5. Robert Merl, 2021. "Literature Review of Experimental Asset Markets with Insiders," Working Paper Series, Social and Economic Sciences 2021-04, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Karl-Franzens-University Graz.
    6. Kleinlercher, Daniel & Stöckl, Thomas, 2021. "Thou shalt not trade—An analysis of the violations of no-trade predictions in experimental asset markets," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C).
    7. Oechssler, Jörg & Schmidt, Carsten & Schnedler, Wendelin, 2011. "On the ingredients for bubble formation: Informed traders and communication," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(11), pages 1831-1851.
    8. David Bodoff & Hugo Levecq & Hongtao Zhang, 2006. "EDGAR on the internet: The welfare effects of wider information distribution in an experimental market for risky assets," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(4), pages 361-381, December.
    9. Matthias Sutter & Jürgen Huber & Michael Kirchler, 2012. "Bubbles and Information: An Experiment," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(2), pages 384-393, February.
    10. Charles N. Noussair & Steven Tucker, 2013. "Experimental Research On Asset Pricing," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 554-569, July.
    11. Stöckl, Thomas & Palan, Stefan, 2018. "Catch me if you can. Can human observers identify insiders in asset markets?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 1-17.
    12. Yang Hao, 2023. "Financial Market with Learning from Price under Knightian Uncertainty," Working Papers hal-03686748, HAL.
    13. Philipp Hornung & Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger & Roland Mestel & Stefan Palan, 2015. "Insider behavior under different market structures: experimental evidence on trading patterns, manipulation, and profitability," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(2), pages 357-373, June.
    14. Thomas Stöckl, 2014. "Price efficiency and trading behavior in limit order markets with competing insiders," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 17(2), pages 314-334, June.
    15. Ackert, Lucy F. & Church, Bryan K. & Zhang, Ping, 2008. "What affects the market's ability to adjust for optimistic forecast bias? Evidence from experimental asset markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 358-372, May.
    16. Ackert, Lucy F. & Church, Bryan K. & Zhang, Ping, 2018. "Informed traders’ performance and the information environment: Evidence from experimental asset markets," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 1-15.
    17. Merl, Robert, 2022. "Literature review of experimental asset markets with insiders," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C).
    18. Stefan Palan & Thomas Stöckl, 2014. "When chasing the offender hurts the victim: Collateral damage from insider legislation," Working Paper Series, Social and Economic Sciences 2014-03, Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences, Karl-Franzens-University Graz.

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