Costly Enforcement of Voluntary Environmental Agreements
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.
Volume (Year): 47 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (September)
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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263
Emissions tax; Enforcement; Self-enforcing agreement; Voluntary agreements; L51; Q58;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Anna Alberini & Kathleen Segerson, 2002. "Assessing Voluntary Programs to Improve Environmental Quality," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 22(1), pages 157-184, June.
- John K. Stranlund & Carlos A. Chavez & Mauricio G. Villena, 2007.
"The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly,"
2007-6, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics.
- Stranlund, John K. & Chávez, Carlos A. & Villena, Mauricio G., 2009. "The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 183-191, September.
- Klaus Conrad, 2001. "Voluntary Environmental Agreements vs. Emission Taxes in Strategic Trade Models," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 19(4), pages 361-381, August.
- Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983.
"On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
- Na Li Dawson & Kathleen Segerson, 2003.
"Voluntary Agreements with Industries: Participation Incentives with Industry-wide Targets,"
2004-06, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
- Na Li Dawson & Kathleen Segerson, 2008. "Voluntary Agreements with Industries: Participation Incentives with Industry-Wide Targets," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 84(1), pages 97-114.
- Keith Brouhle & Charles Griffiths & Ann Wolverton, 2004. "The Use of Voluntary Approaches for Environmental Policymaking in the U.S," NCEE Working Paper Series 200405, National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, revised May 2004.
- Glachant, Matthieu, 2007.
"Non-binding voluntary agreements,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 32-48, July.
- Blackman, Allen & Uribe, Eduardo & van Hoof, Bart & Lyon, Thomas P., 2012.
"Voluntary Environmental Agreements in Developing Countries: The Colombian Experience,"
dp-12-06, Resources For the Future.
- Allen Blackman & Eduardo Uribe & Bart Hoof & Thomas Lyon, 2013. "Voluntary environmental agreements in developing countries: the Colombian experience," Policy Sciences, Springer, vol. 46(4), pages 335-385, December.
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