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Pollution Abatement Subsidies and the Eco-Industry

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Author Info

  • Maia David

    ()

  • Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné

    ()

Abstract

Cet article étudie avec un regard nouveau la subvention environnementale lorsque les pollueurs achètent leur bien ou service de dépollution auprès d’une industrie spécialisée, dite éco-industrie. L’éco-industrie est ici oligopolistique. Le régulateur est donc confronté à une double distorsion : la pollution et l’imperfection de la concurrence dans l’industrie de l’environnement. Nous montrons que la combinaison d’une taxe sur la pollution et d’une subvention aux pollueurs par unité de dépollution ne permet pas d’atteindre l’optimum social alors qu’on obtient la conclusion inverse lorsque la subvention est adressée à l’éco-industrie, par unité de production. Lorsqu’il existe des coûts de transfert des fonds publics, il peut être préférable d’utiliser la taxe environnementale seule.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10640-009-9315-3
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists in its journal Environmental and Resource Economics.

Volume (Year): 45 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
Pages: 271-282

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Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:45:y:2010:i:2:p:271-282

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100263

Related research

Keywords: Environment goods and services industry; Pigouvian taxes; Pollution abatement subsidies; H23; L13; Q58;

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References

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  1. Don Fullerton & Robert D. Mohr, 2002. "Suggested Subsidies are Sub-optimal Unless Combined with an Output Tax," NBER Working Papers 8723, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Joan Canton & Antoine Soubeyran & Hubert Stahn, 2008. "Environmental Taxation and Vertical Cournot Oligopolies: How Eco-industries Matter," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(3), pages 369-382, July.
  3. Maia David & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2005. "Environmental regulation and the eco-industry," Working Papers hal-00243019, HAL.
  4. Lerner, Abba P, 1972. "Pollution Abatement Subsidies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 62(5), pages 1009-10, December.
  5. Carlo Carraro & Gilbert E. Metcalf, 2001. "Behavioral and Distributional Effects of Environmental Policy," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number carr01-1, May.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Johanna Reichenbach & Till Requate, 2011. "Subsidies for Renewable Energies in the Presence of Learning Effects and Market Power," Kiel Working Papers 1689, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  2. David, Maia & Nimubona, Alain-Désiré & Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard, 2011. "Emission taxes and the market for abatement goods and services," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 179-191, January.
  3. Alain-Désiré Nimubona & Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné, 2010. "Polluters and Abaters," Working Papers 1009, University of Waterloo, Department of Economics, revised Sep 2010.
  4. Alain-Désiré Nimubona, 2012. "Pollution Policy and Trade Liberalization of Environmental Goods," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(3), pages 323-346, November.
  5. Idrissa Sibailly, 2013. "On licensing and diffusion of clean technologies in oligopoly," Working Papers hal-00911453, HAL.
  6. Mohajan, Haradhan, 2011. "Optimal Environmental Taxes Due to Health Effect," MPRA Paper 50672, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 17 Apr 2011.
  7. Grischa Perino, 2010. "Technology Diffusion with Market Power in the Upstream Industry," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(4), pages 403-428, August.
  8. Haradhan Kumar Mohajan, 2011. "Optimal Environmental Taxes Due to Health Effect," KASBIT Journal of Management & Social Science, Khadim Ali Shah Bukhari Institute of Technology (KASBIT), vol. 4, pages 1-19, December.
  9. Sonia Schwartz & Hubert Stahn, 2010. "Competitive Permit Markets and Vertical Structures: The Relevance of Imperfect Competitive Eco-Industries," Working Papers halshs-00501831, HAL.
  10. Hattori, Keisuke, 2011. "Optimal Environmental Policy under Monopolistic Provision of Clean Technologies," MPRA Paper 28837, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Idrissa Sibailly, 2013. "On the Pigouvian Tax Rule in an Open Economy: Opening the Gate to the Eco-industry," Working Papers hal-00911464, HAL.
  12. Zylicz, Tomasz, 2010. "Goals and Principles of Environmental Policy," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 3(4), pages 299-334, May.
  13. Eichner, Thomas & Pethig, Rüdiger, 2014. "International carbon emissions trading and strategic incentives to subsidize green energy," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 469-486.
  14. Julien Jacob, 2011. "Innovation and diffusion in risky industries under liability law: the case of “double-impact” innovations," Working Papers of BETA 2011-24, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.

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