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Supranational integration and national reorganization: On the Maastricht treaty’s impact on fiscal decentralization in EU countries

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  • Thushyanthan Baskaran

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 21 (2010)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 309-335

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Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:21:y:2010:i:4:p:309-335

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866

Related research

Keywords: Fiscal decentralization; Maastricht treaty; Supranational integration; Institutional change; F15; F53; H77;

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References

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  1. Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gerard & Spolaore, Enrico, 1996. "Economic theories of the break-up and integration of nations," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 697-705, April.
  2. Sharma, Chanchal Kumar, 2004. "Why Decentralization ? The Puzzle of causation," MPRA Paper 196, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Feb 2005.
  3. Enrico Spolaore & Alberto Alesina & Romain Wacziarg, 2000. "Economic Integration and Political Disintegration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(5), pages 1276-1296, December.
  4. Andreas Kyriacou, 2009. "Decision rules, membership and political centralization in the European Union," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 143-158, April.
  5. Sinn, Hans-Werner, 1994. "How much Europe? Subsidiarity, centralization and fiscal competition," Munich Reprints in Economics 19838, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  6. Alesina, Alberto & Wacziarg, Romain, 1999. "Is Europe going too far?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-42, December.
  7. Bednar, Jenna & Ferejohn, John & Garrett, Geoffrey, 1996. "The politics of European federalism," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 279-294, September.
  8. Panizza, Ugo, 1999. "On the determinants of fiscal centralization: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 97-139, October.
  9. Joshua Angrist & Alan Krueger, 1998. "Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics," Working papers 98-7, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  10. Michele Ruta, 2005. "Economic Theories of Political (Dis)integration," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(1), pages 1-21, 02.
  11. Isabelle Joumard & Per Mathis Kongsrud, 2003. "Fiscal Relations across Government Levels," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 375, OECD Publishing.
  12. Bolton, Patrick & Roland, Gérard, 1995. "The Break up of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 1225, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. DREZE , Jacques H., 1993. "Regions of Europe : A Feasible Status, to be discussed," CORE Discussion Papers 1993037, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Alberto Alesina & Enrico Spolaore, 1995. "On the Number and Size of Nations," NBER Working Papers 5050, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  15. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?," NBER Working Papers 5537, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-46, May.
  17. Stegarescu, Dan, 2004. "Economic Integration and Fiscal Decentralization: Evidence from OECD Countries," ZEW Discussion Papers 04-86, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  18. Oates, Wallace E, 1985. "Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 748-57, September.
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Cited by:
  1. Oto-Peralías, Daniel & Romero-Ávila, Diego & Usabiaga, Carlos, 2013. "Does fiscal decentralization mitigate the adverse effects of corruption on public deficits?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 205-231.

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