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Why risk popular ratification failure? A comparative analysis of the choice of the ratification instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU

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  • Daniel Finke
  • Thomas König

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  • Daniel Finke & Thomas König, 2009. "Why risk popular ratification failure? A comparative analysis of the choice of the ratification instrument in the 25 Member States of the EU," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 341-365, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:20:y:2009:i:3:p:341-365
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-008-9068-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lars P. Feld & Sarah Necker & Bruno S. Frey, 2015. "Happiness of economists," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(10), pages 990-1007, February.
    2. McKelvey Richard D. & Palfrey Thomas R., 1995. "Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal Form Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 6-38, July.
    3. Bruno S. Frey, 2018. "Economics of Happiness," SpringerBriefs in Economics, Springer, number 978-3-319-75807-7, October.
    4. Pommerehne, Werner W., 1978. "Institutional approaches to public expenditure : Empirical evidence from Swiss municipalities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(2), pages 255-280, April.
    5. Matsusaka, John G & McCarty, Nolan M, 2001. "Political Resource Allocation: Benefits and Costs of Voter Initiatives," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 17(2), pages 413-448, October.
    6. Lars P. Feld & Marcel R. Savioz, 1997. "Direct Democracy Matters for Economic Performance: An Empirical Investigation," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 507-538, November.
    7. Dennis Mueller, 2005. "Constitutional political economy in the European Union," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 57-73, July.
    8. Signorino, Curtis S., 1999. "Strategic Interaction and the Statistical Analysis of International Conflict," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 93(2), pages 279-297, June.
    9. Frey, Bruno S & Stutzer, Alois, 2000. "Happiness, Economy and Institutions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 110(466), pages 918-938, October.
    10. Claes H. De Vreese & Hajo G. Boomgaarden, 2006. "Media Effects on Public Opinion about the Enlargement of the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(2), pages 419-436, June.
    11. Thomas Romer & Howard Rosenthal, 1979. "Bureaucrats Versus Voters: On the Political Economy of Resource Allocation by Direct Democracy," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 93(4), pages 563-587.
    12. Lupia, Arthur, 1992. "Busy Voters, Agenda Control, and the Power of Information," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 86(2), pages 390-403, June.
    13. Matsusaka, John G., 2004. "For the Many or the Few," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226510811, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Barbara Dluhosch & Nikolai Ziegler, 2011. "The paradox of weakness in the politics of trade integration," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 325-354, December.
    2. Aude Bicquelet & Helen Addison, 2017. "How to refuse a vote on the EU? The case against the referendum in the House of Commons (1974–2010)," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 51(5), pages 2141-2162, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    European integration; Ratification; Referenda; Comparative politics; Institutional reform; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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