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The European Union: confederation, federation or association of compound states?

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  • Charles Blankart

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Abstract

The European Union of today is neither a confederation nor a federation, but rather an association of compound states. It is shown that this mixture of two forms of constitutional contracts implies inconsistencies prone to political deadlocks. A Buchanan/Tullock/Rawls approach to a reform suggests a clear choice between either a confederation or a federation. In this paper, however, it is proposed to follow a Hayekian approach in which issue fields are allocated to a confederation or to a federation, respectively depending on the revealed homogeneity of preferences of the citizens across the Member States. Hence both, Council and European Parliament, would remain the central decision makers but with separate tasks. Suggestions are made how to improve their election and their decision rules. The paper should contribute to the debate on reforming the European institutions which emerged after the rejection of the constitutional draft by the French and Dutch voters in 2005. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10602-007-9015-3
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Constitutional Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 18 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 99-106

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Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:18:y:2007:i:2:p:99-106

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102866

Related research

Keywords: Constitutional economics; European Union; D70;

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  1. Mueller, Dennis C, 1997. " Federalism and the European Union: A Constitutional Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 255-80, March.
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Cited by:
  1. Bodo Knoll & Andreas Koenig, 2010. "Leviathan Europa - Stärkung der Nationalstaaten und der EU durch konstitutionelle Schranken?," Diskussionspapiere aus dem Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre der Universität Hohenheim 321/2010, Department of Economics, University of Hohenheim, Germany.

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